Auteur: Snow, Nancy
Titel: Virtue as Social Intelligence
Sub titel: An Empirically Grounded Theory
`Virtue as Social Intelligence' takes on the claims of philosophical situationism, the ethical theory that is skeptical about the possibility of human virtue. Influenced by social psychological studies, philosophical situationists argue that human personality is too fluid and fragmented to support a stable set of virtues. They claim that virtue – defined as an enduring disposition that incorporates practical reason, appropriate motivation, and affect – cannot be grounded in empirical psychology. This book argues otherwise. Drawing on the work of psychologists Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda, Nancy E. Snow argues that the social psychological experiments that philosophical situationists rely on look at the wrong kinds of situations to test for behavioral consistency. Rather than looking at situations that are objectively similar, researchers need to compare situations that have similar meanings for the subject. When this is done, subjects exhibit behavioral consistencies that warrant the attribution of enduring traits. Virtues are a subset of these traits. Virtue can thus be empirically grounded, and virtue ethics has nothing to fear from philosophical situationism.
2009, 176 pag., Euro 23,25
Routledge, London, ISBN 9780415999106
This page last updated on: 13-1-2015